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WELLS FARGO ARMORED 
SERVICE CORPORATION, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, MILLY 0. BERNARD, 
Chairman, DAVID R. IRVINE, 
and KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
Commissioners of the PUBLIC 
SERVICE _COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and BRINKS, INC., 
Case No. 16862 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BRINKS, INC. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent Brinks, Inc. ("Brinks") applied for a 
certificate of exemption from regulation by the Public Service 
Commission of the State of Utah (the "Commission"). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER TRIBUNAL 
The Commission granted Brinks' application for a 
certificate of exemption from regulation. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Brinks respectfully asks this court to uphold the 
Commission's order granting Brinks' application for a certificate 
of exemption from regulation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brinks and its predecessors have been engaged for over a 
century in the business of transporting money and other 
valuables. Much of this transportation occurs by means of 
armored vehicles. At the present time, Brinks is the largest 
carrier by armored vehicle in the United States. 
Pursuant to contracts with various individuals a~ 
business entities, Brinks has for the last four and one-half 
years been engaged in the business of transporting money and 
other valuables by armored vehicle within the State of Utah. 
Until September, 19 78, these services were rendered within 
fifteen miles of the city limits of Salt Lake City. Beginning at 
that time, however, Brinks began rendering weekly service for a 
local bank to and from the bank's Snowbird, Utah branch. Other 
individuals and business entities have requested and continue to 
request applicant to render services at points beyond a fifteen 
mile radius of Salt Lake City. 
Section 54-6-12 ( f) , Utah Code Annotated exempts certain 
vehicles from the regulatory provisions of the Motor vehicle 
Transportation Act. A reading of the statute, however, reveals 
-2-
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an ambiguity with respect to the type of vehicles exempted from 
regulation. · To obtain a resolution of this ambiguity, Brinks 
appeared before the Public Service Commission of the State of 
Utah seeking an order exempting it from Commission regulation. 
On January 29, 1979, the Commission heard the arguments of Brinks 
and of appellant Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation ("Wells 
Fargo") , then a protestant to Br inks' 
31, 197 9, the Commission issued its 
application. On October 
report and order granting 
Brinks a certificate of exemption from regulation. On November 
19, 1979, Wells Fargo unsuccessfully sought a rehearing before 
the Commission. 
in this Court. 
Thereafter, Wells Fargo instituted proceedings 
In the Statement of Facts set forth in its brief, Wells 
Fargo states that the "single issue raised in this appeal is the 
proper construction of Section 54-6-12(f) Utah Code Annotated." 
Brinks submits that additional issues of administrative agency 
expertise and discretion are present and should be considered in 
the review of this matter. 
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ARGUMENT 
Section 54-6-12 (f) , Utah Code Annotated, exempts certain 
vehicles from the regulatory provisions of the Motor Vehicle 
Transportation Act. The Act generally does not apply 
[t] o motor vehicles when especially constructed 
for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or repair 
purposes, and not otherwise used in transporting 
goods and merchandise for compensation~ or when 
constructed as armored cars and used for the safe 
conveyance or delivery of money or other 
valuables, or when used as hearses, ambulances or 
licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen 
mile radius of the limits of any city or town; or 
to motor vehicles used as ambulances or hearses 
by any person, firm or corporation duly licensed 
in the state as an embalmer, funeral director, or 
as a mortuary establishment, provided that use of 
such motor vehicles as an ambulance shall be 
incidental to the use of embalming or funeral 
directing. 
Pursuant to Brinks' application and after due 
consideration, the Public Service Commission ruled that the 
fifteen-mile limitation set forth in the foregoing provision 
applied only to "hearses, ambulances or licensed taxicabs" and 
not to armored cars "used for the safe conveyance or delivery of 
money or other valuables." Brinks submits that the Commission's 
ruling was entirely correct, reasonable, and well within the 
realm of the Commission's permissible discretion. Wells Fargo's 
opposition to the Commission's determination can only be viewed 
as an unreasonable fear of the competition newly provided by 
Brinks in an otherwise monopolistic market. 
-4-
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I. THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY 
CONSTRUED THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION 
In its Report and Order granting Br inks an exemption 
from Commission regulation, the Commisson noted that an ambiguity 
existed in the statutory provision. The Commission then relied 
on the "last antecedent rule" of statutory construction and on 
reasoned public policy to resolve the ambiguity. 
A. RULES OF GRAMMAR AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION. 
The statutory exemption is given in a complex sentence 
susceptible of grammatical analysis. The sentence may be 
displayed as follows: 
[The Motor Vehicle Transportation Act does 
not apply to] motor vehicles 
when especially constructed for towing, wrecking, 
maintenance or repair purposes, and not otherwise 
used in transporting goods and merchandise for 
compensation; or 
when constructed as armored cars and used for the 
safe conveyance or delivery of money of other 
valuables, or 
when used as hearses, ambulances or licensed 
taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile radius 
of any city or town ... 
(Emphasis added.) The first part of the quoted portion of the 
statute consists of a subject ("Motor Vehicle Transportation 
Act"), a verb and adverb ("does not apply"}, and a prepositional 
phrase ("to motor vehicles") which is modified by three adjective 
-5-
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clauses introduced in each case by the relative adverb "when." 
From a grammatical and logical standpoint, each clause describes 
a separate and identifiable category of vehicles exempted from 
regulation by the Act. 
As indicated by the foregoing display, however, a fourth 
clause, the participial phrase "operating within a fifteen mile 
radius of any city or town," is different in nature and operation 
from the preceding three. It is a more limited modifier the 
antecedent of which must be found nearer at hand than the 
antecedent for the first clauses. Structurally, the antecedent 
is "hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs." It is grammat-
ically unsound to attempt to carry the fifteen-mile restriction 
further back in the statutory 1 language. See generally M. 
SEMMELMEYER & D. BOLANDER, INSTANT ENGLISH HANDBOOK 210-18, 
lThe following phraseology would have been closer to 
expressing such a legislative intent to apply the restriction 
to armored cars: 
To motor vehicles when especially 
constructed. for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or 
repair purposes, and not otherwise used in trans-
porting goods and merchandise for compensation; 
or when constructed or used either as armored 
cars for the safe conveyance of delivery of money 
or other valuables, or as hearses, ambulances or 
licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen 
mile radius of the limits of any city or town 
Here, among other changes, the third "when" is omitted and the 
participial phrase "operating within a fifteen mile radi~s of the 
limits of any city or town" can at (footnote 1 continued on p. 7) 
-6-
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237-47 (1968). As the Commission noted, 
the dependent clause "or when constructed as 
armored cars and used for the safe conveyance or 
delivery of money or other valuables", is 
separated from the next dependent clause by the 
strong disjunctive "or when". This would 
strongly suggest that armored cars are in a 
separate category from "hearses, ambulances, or 
licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen 
mile radius .•. " 
Report and Order of Commission, p. 4. 
The Commission's construction is supported by the "last 
antecedent rule." The rule states that where no contrary 
intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and 
phrases refer only to the last antecedent and not to more remote 
phrases. ~, Ruthrauff v. Kensinger, 214 Kan. 185, 519 P.2d 
661 (1974) ; Caughey v. Employment Security Department, 81 Wash. 
2d 597, 503 P. 2d 460 (1972); People v. Baker, 69 Cal. 2d 44, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675 (1968). 
(footnote 1 continued) 
least arguably modify the entire preceding adjective clause 
introduced by the second "when," thereby applying the limita-
tion to armored cars. 
Speculation as to what the legislature might have 
done, however, is of limited use. Indeed, legislative 
acquiescense, consent, or intent is not to be found in 
legislative silence. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 
U.S. 464, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959) ~ Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, 
Inc., 456 F. 2d 890 (19th Cir. 1972). For this reason, Wells 
Fargo's discussion of what the Legislature "could have" done to 
show what the Legislature in fact did, ·is misleading and 
incorrect as a matter of law. Brief of Wells Fargo, p. 11-12, 
quoting dissent from Report and Order of Commission, p. 6. 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 731 
(Utah 1977) , this Court discussed the last antecedent rule, 
noting that the rule required that qualifying words and phrases 
be applied to the immediately preceding words, rather than tc 
more remote ones. The Court did mention that the rule is not 
absolute; for example, if there are several preceding terms of 
the same character, the qualifier may modify all of the terms, 
but only if the natural and sensible meaning of the wording so 
requires. 568 P.2d at 740-41. 
This exception to the last antecedent rule noted by the 
Court, however, is inapplicable to the instant case. 
"terms of the same character" modified by the 
Here, the 
qualifier 
"operating within a fifteen mile radius of any city or town" are 
the "hearses, ambulances or licensed taxicabs." Armored cars are 
clearly of a different character altogether, both because of 
their actual function and, as discussed above, because of their 
grammatical placement in a different category. In addition, as 
also shown above, the "natural and sensible meaning of the 
wording" does not require the modification of all the terms by 
the qualifier; in fact, the natural and sensible meaning of the 
wording would be perverted by the relation back of the 
fifteen-mile restriction to armored cars. 
B. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE ARE FURTHERED BY 
THE COMMISSON'S DETERMINATION. 
-8-
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The Commission also analyzed the statutory exemption in 
terms of its underlying policies. When there is uncertainty as 
to the meaning and proper application of a statute, it is proper 
to look both to the purpose for which it was created and to the 
practical aspects of its operation. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah, 1977); State v. Salt Lake City 
Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468, 469 
(1962) . 
Here, the limited exemption of hearses, ambulances, and 
licensed taxicabs from the Motor Vehicle Transportation Act and 
Public Service Commission regulation must be based on a set of 
progressive assumptions: (1) hearses, ambulances, and licensed 
taxicabs all perform highly visible, important, and personal 
services to the general public; (2) such services are potentially 
likely to be carried out in an unsafe or inappropriate manner 
absent certain standards of performance set by state or local 
governments; (3) cities and towns may regulate the hearses, 
ambulances, and taxicabs within their jurisdiction~ and (4) 
because of such city and town regulation, Public Service 
Commisson regulation of hearses, ambulances and licenses taxicabs 
is unnecessary within a fifteen mile limit of any city or town. 
Thus, the Public Service Commission may regulate hearses, 
ambulances, and licensed taxicabs beyond the fifteen-mile limit 
both because beyond the limit such vehicles are no longer subject 
-9-
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to local regulation and because at least in the case oj 
taxicabs -- the vehicles enter competition with carriers alread1 
regulated by the Commission. 
Armored car services do not fit within the foregoing 
assumptions. As noted, most of the modes of 
such as hearses, ambulances, and taxicabs 
transportation --
which are brought 
within the Public Service Commission jurisdiction by the statute 
are those whch serve the general public. Those modes of 
transportation, however, are not susceptible to the regulation by 
the public which they serve. Armored car services are clearly 
distinguishable in this regard because of the specialized service 
which they offer. They principally serve financial institutions 
having sufficient economic power to insist upon safe, efficient, 
and proper service. 
The market which armored cars serve, therefore, may be 
deemed to more than adequately regulate them. This is the case 
whether or not their operation is confined to the fifteen-mile 
limit. With respect to armored cars, then, there is no logical 
or public policy basis for distinguishing between vehicles 
operating within a fifteen-mile radius of any city or town and 
vehicles operating outside such an area. In sum, armored car 
service is not an area of transportation that needs regulation. 
The statute, therefore, "should not be extended by construction 
-10-
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beyond the correction of evils sought by it. 11 73 AM. JUR. 2d 
Statutes §157 (1974) . 
Relying on such reasoning, the Commisson noted that 
the character of the business conducted by appli-
cant is fundamentally different from that oper-
ated by the proprietors of hearses, ambulances, 
or taxicabs. The latter involves transportation 
of passengers, or human bodies, which likely, in 
the estimation of surviving relatives, deserve 
some care and consideration in their transporta-
tion. The carriage of money and other valuables 
involves quite different considerations. 
Further, as pointed out by Applicant in its memo-
randum, the potential customers for Applicant's 
specialized service are financial institutions in 
a strong bargaining position, vis-a-vis Appli-
cant. The need for regulation by this Commission 
would, accordingly, appear to be minimal. 
Report and Order of Commission, p. 4. This declaration of 
the Commission relative to the statute's purpose should be 
given great weight since a "fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation" requires a statute to be examined "in 
accordance with the purpose which was sought to be 
accomplished." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977). 
Lastly, in this regard, it is relevant to note 
that the application of the 15-mile limit has been before 
this Court on at least one occasion, when the Court quoted 
the statute as follows: 
(f) * * * [wreckers] * * * [armored cars] 
* * * hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, 
operating within a fifteen-mile radius of the 
limits of any city or town. * * * 
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Realty Purchasing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 9 Utah 2d 
375, 345 P.2d 606, 607-08 (1959) (asterisks, brackets, and 
emphasis by the Court). Although the case involved only 
taxicabs, the Court's quotation of the statute in the above 
manner indicates that in the Court's view armored cars were 
different in nature from hearses, ambulances, or licensed 
taxicabs. 
C. PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION IN THE INSTANT 
MATTER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION HAD NEVER 
BEEN FULLY AND PROPERLY CONSIDERED. 
Contrary to the assertion in Wells Fargo's brief, the 
question of the correct construction of Section 54-6-12(f) with 
respect to armored cars had never been fully and properly 
considered prior to the Commission's ruling in the instant 
matter. 
At the outset, it must be noted that the rule of stare 
decisis, generally followed by courts of law, has no applica-
tion in the administrative agency context. See Reaveley v. 
Public Service Commission, 20 Utah 2d 237, 436 P.2d 797, 
799-800 (1968), citing 73 C.J. S. Public Administrative Bodies 
and Procedure § 148 (1951). The rule is not applied for the 
reason that administrative agencies require great flexibility 
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in executing their peculiar responsibilit~es: 
Certainly an administrative agency which has 
a duty to protect the public interest ought not 
be precluded from improving its collective mind 
should it find that a prior decision is not now 
in accordance with its present idea of what the 
public interest requires. 
4 3 6 P . 2d at 8 0 O • 
Even if, however, the rule of stare decisis was 
applicable to the Commission's proceedings, the instant matter is 
not one in which the rule should - or even could - be employed. 
The only prior occasion mentioned by Wells Fargo when the 
Commission even arguably considered the meaning of Section 
54-6-12(f) was Wells Fargo's own ex parte application for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity. But, as the Commission 
noted, on that occasion, Wells Fargo's application "was 
unopposed, and there appears nothing in the Report and Order to 
indicate that the applicability of the exemption was argued by 
any of the parties." Thus, the instant matter involving Brink's 
application for a certificate of exemption was, the Commission 
concluded, "the first time the construction [of the statute] has 
been argued in an adversary proceeding." Hence, the Commission 
determined to "examine the question afresh." Report and Order of 
Commission, p. 3. 
Wells Fargo's fear of the competition to be provided by 
Brinks' services is most evident in this context. For "some 
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years" Wells Fargo itself operated beyond the 15-mile limit of 
cities and towns without a certificate of convenience and 
necessity, thus demonstrating at once its recognition of the 
ambiguity of the statute and its opinion of how the ambiguity 
should be resolved. Report and Order of Commission, p. 3. For 
Wells Fargo now to contest the Commission's order re-creating the 
conditions under which Wells Fargo operated during prior years is 
irrational unless, of course, one looks for anticompetitive 
motivations. Given the Commission's Ruling and Order, and the 
absence of any indication of contrary legislative intent, there 
is no need to protect a large corporation like Wells Fargo behind 
the skirts of administrative regulation. 
II. THE COMMISSION ACTED WITHIN THE REALM 
OF ITS EXPERTISE AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
It is an axiom of administrative law that a reviewing 
court will not substitute its own judgment for the wisdom of an 
administrative agency where the agency's power is exercised 
reasonably 
authority. 
266 (1966). 
and within the scope of the agency's lawful 
Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P. 2d 264, 
In fact, this Court has noted the presumption that 
an agency possesses superior knowledge and expertise within the 
area of the agency's responsibility, and has emphasized its 
corresponding reluctance to interfere with the agency's exercise 
of that responsibility. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah state 
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Tax Commission, 590 P. 2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979); Greyhound Lines, 
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 547 P.2d 199, 201 (Utah 1976); 
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 
638, 641 (1972). The Court has stated, 
It is not our prerogative to pass upon the 
wisdom of the Commission's decision. It is 
charged with the responsibility of general 
supervision and regulation of the common carriers 
of this state and of seeing that the public 
receives the most efficient and economical 
service possible. 
Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P. 2d 264, 266 
(1966). At the very least, the interpretation of a 
statute by the administrative agency called to administer 
it is persuasive and entitled to be given weight. See 
Sa 1 t Lake Ci t y v • Sa 1 t Lake County , 5 6 8 P. 2d 7 3 8 , 7 41- 4 2 
(Utah 1977); Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Barton Truck Line, 
Inc., 8 Utah 2d 401, 335 P.2d 829 (1959); 73 C.J.S. Public 
Administrative Bodies and Procedure §69 (1951); 82 C.J.S. 
Statutes, §359(a) (1953). 
The instant matter shows clearly the widsom of 
the foregoing policies. The Public Service Commission is 
charged with the regulation of certain types of motor 
carriers. The Commission daily must discharge its 
responsibilities, taking into account the nature of the 
services involved and the paramount needs of the public. 
The Commission is most aware of the operations of the 
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carriers involved in the instant matter. The commission 
is best situated to ascertain the optimum manner of 
effecting the public policy undergirding Section 
54-6-12(£). 
Certainly, in the instant matter, the Commission 
interpreted the statute reasonably. Wells Fargo is not 
entitled to have the Commission's order reversed merely 
because Wells Fargo can create an alternative 
interpretation of the statute. Even if an alternative 
reasonable interpretation exists, Wells Fargo can point to 
no arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the 
Commission. Absent such action, as this Court has 
recently emphasized, the Commission's decisions will not 
be reversed. Empire Electric Association, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 604 P.d 930 (Utah 1979), citing Utah 
Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 Utah 2d 
310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967) and Mulcahy v. Public Service 
Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298 (1941); Petty v. 
Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1979). 
Relevant to such considerations is Section 
54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated: 
The review [by the Supreme Court of a 
Commission decision] shall not be extended 
further than to determine whether the commission 
has regularly pursued its authority, including a 
determination of whether the order or decision 
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under review violates any right of the petitioner 
under the Constitution of the United States or of 
the state of Utah. 
This Court has held that such a review is to determine 
whether the Commission has acted beyond its jurisdiction 
or in a "capricious, arbitrary, or wholly unreasonable" 
manner. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 
Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 {1959). In the instant matter, 
the Commission acted well within its jurisdiction and 
acted in an entirely reasonable manner. The law and 
public policy of this state will best be served by 
upholding the Report and Order of the Public Service 
Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Brinks respect-
fully urges this Court to uphold the Report and Order of 
the Public Service Commission in this matter. 
DATED this day of April, 1980. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By: ______ ..,--____________________ ~ 
Calvin L. Rampton 
By: ______________ _,_ ____________ ~ 
James s. Lowrie 
By: __________ --=----=~----------~ 
Gregg I. Alvord 
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